Voting Rights and Democracy Forum
Volume 1

Issue 1

2022

An Anniversary Best Uncelebrated: The 75th Year of the
Presidential Succession Act of 1947
Roy E. Brownell II
John Rogan
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/vrdf
Part of the Election Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Roy E. Brownell II & John Rogan, An Anniversary Best Uncelebrated: The 75th Year of the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947, 1 FORDHAM VOTING RTS. & DEMOCRACY F. 35 (2022).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/vrdf/vol1/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Voting Rights and Democracy Forum by an authorized editor of
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

AN ANNIVERSARY BEST UNCELEBRATED:
THE 75TH YEAR OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT OF 1947
Roy E. Brownell II* & John Rogan**
On July 18, 1947, President Harry Truman signed the
Presidential Succession Act into law. The 1947 Act placed the
Speaker of the House and the Senate president pro tempore in the
presidential line of succession. Seventy-five years later, the statute
needs major revision. Although the 1947 Act has not been used, the
nation’s good fortune may change at any moment, especially given
ever-present threats to the health and safety of the president and
vice president.
This Article argues that Congress should revise the 1947 law
in several ways, most notably by making Cabinet secretaries, in
most circumstances, the immediate successors to the presidency
after the vice president.
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INTRODUCTION
Seventy-five years ago, the Presidential Succession Act of
1947 (“1947 Act”) became law.1 Unfortunately, this is not an
anniversary to celebrate. The statute, which sets out the presidential
line of succession following the vice president, needs major
revision. Of late, threats to the president and vice president have
come into sharp relief. President Joe Biden, Vice President Kamala
Harris, and former President Donald Trump each became infected
with COVID-19. An aggressive, nuclear-armed Russia as well as
* Author and Attorney, Washington, D.C. (https://roybrownell.com/).
** Senior Fellow, Fordham University School of Law. Both authors wish to thank
John D. Feerick and Joel K. Goldstein for their comments on an earlier draft. All
errors remain the authors’ alone.
1
See Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19
(2006)). See generally Presidential Succession Act, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/about/officers-staff/president-pro-tempore/presidentialsuccession-act.htm [https://perma.cc/7WMM-AJF7] (last visited Oct. 23, 2022).
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menacing phenomena such as Havana Syndrome 2 point to
continuing threats on the horizon.3 And the fierce partisan division
that currently characterizes American politics only heightens
concerns over governmental stability under the current succession
law. The shortcomings in the statute need to be addressed now to
ensure continuous leadership in the executive branch and legitimate
democratic governance.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the
succession system and analyzes how it falls short. Part II argues that
Congress should revise the 1947 law in several ways, most notably
by making Cabinet secretaries the immediate successors to the
presidency after the vice president in most contexts. Ultimately,
while no system can account for all possible contingencies, this
Article contends that Cabinet succession—with some additional
modifications—would greatly improve the state of presidential
succession.
I. THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT OF 1947:
HISTORY AND SHORTCOMINGS
Should there be a dual vacancy or incapacity in both the
presidency and vice presidency, the 1947 Act provides that the
Speaker of the House of Representatives is next in line to become
acting president.4 After the Speaker, the next up is the Senate
president pro tempore, typically the member of the upper chamber’s
majority party with the most seniority. These two lawmakers are
followed by Cabinet secretaries in the order of their position’s
creation.5 Pursuant to the statute, each successor would need to
resign from their underlying post to become acting president.6 The
current statute, however, is fraught with significant problems, as

2

See, e.g., Scott Pelley, Havana Syndrome: High-Level National Security
Officials Stricken with Unexplained Illness on White House Grounds, CBS NEWS
(June 26, 2022, 6:55 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/havana-syndromewhite-house-cabinet-60-minutes-2022-06-26/ [https://perma.cc/PD5U-JQES].
3
See Erin Degregorio, Fordham Law Symposium Explores the Presidential
Succession Act at Its 75th Anniversary, FORDHAM L. NEWS (Apr. 29, 2022),
https://news.law.fordham.edu/blog/2022/04/29/fordham-law-symposiumpresidential-succession-act-75th-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/AW8S-ZXR2]
(remarks by Dr. Joseph J. Fins).
4
For discussion of what to do if a dual incapacity occurs prior to adoption of
reforms, see Roy E. Brownell II, What to Do If Simultaneous Presidential and
Vice Presidential Inability Struck Today, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1027 (2017).
5
See William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of Presidential
Succession: “The Emperor Has No Clones,” 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1421 n.110
(1987).
6
See 3 U.S.C. § 19.
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discussed at an April 2022 program at Fordham University School
of Law.7
Providentially, the nation has never experienced
simultaneous vacancies or incapacities in both the presidency and
vice presidency. But there have been some close shaves, such as
during the administrations of James Madison, John Tyler, Andrew
Johnson, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan.8
One problem with having lawmakers as successors in dual
vacancy and dual incapacity scenarios is the potential for a sudden
switch in partisan control of the White House. Succession is
challenging enough when the vice president is of the same party as
the president. But, given today’s partisan and ideological division,
the prospect of an elected president and vice president being
replaced by someone from the opposite party—and essentially
overturning the results of the last national election—presents a
deeply unsettling picture.9 Many Americans would likely view such
a succession as illegitimate and undemocratic.
In addition to concerns regarding partisan control over the
presidency switching hands, questions exist about the
constitutionality of legislators serving as successors. Article II of
the Constitution provides that Congress may legislate what
“Officer” shall serve as acting president.10 The key question is what
constitutes an “Officer” under the Clause. Scholars disagree as to
whether the term includes the Speaker or president pro tempore.
Many believe “Officer” means the exact same thing as “Officer of
the United States,” which denotes officials within the executive and
judicial branches and would therefore preclude legislative officers
from presidential succession. 11
Those who defend the
constitutionality of lawmaker succession note that the Framers
chose the more expansive word “Officer” and rejected “Officer of
7

See generally Degregorio, supra note 3. Notably, Fordham University School
of Law has a deep history of promoting solutions to the flaws in the presidential
succession system—beginning with Dean Emeritus John D. Feerick’s October
1963 article in the Fordham Law Review. See John D. Feerick, The Problem of
Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73
(1963).
8
See Degregorio, supra note 3 (remarks by Roy E. Brownell II).
9
See, e.g., Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman, The Weird Scenario That Pits
President Pelosi Against Citizen Trump, ATLANTIC (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/2020-election-could-pitpelosi-against-trump/602308/ [https://perma.cc/54YS-XHS9]; Jack Goldsmith &
Ben Miller-Gootnick, A Presidential Succession Nightmare, LAWFARE (Mar. 25,
2020, 1:38 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/presidential-successionnightmare [https://perma.cc/AE23-H9JG].
10
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
11
See, e.g., Ruth. C. Silva, The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 47 MICH. L.
REV. 451, 457-64 (1949); Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the
Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 114-17
(1995).
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the United States,” reflecting a meaning which therefore
encompasses legislative officers.12
The very fact that good faith disagreement exists among
legal experts about the validity of lawmaker succession is reason
enough to remove them from the line of succession. Any legal doubt
could prompt litigation and cast a pall of illegitimacy over an acting
president.
The requirement that any successor resign from his or her
underlying position presents its own problems. In a situation
involving a de facto incapacitated president and vice president, this
provision might deter potential presidential successors from
choosing to become acting president when they otherwise should.
Successors might believe they would serve only for a brief period
before being displaced by the recovered president or vice president
and ending up without a job. 13 Mandatory resignation also raises
constitutional questions, as some believe that holding an underlying
office is essential to being an “Officer” and thereby remaining
eligible to serve as acting president.14
Under the 1947 Act, if the resignation requirement or some
other consideration discouraged the Speaker or the president pro
tempore from serving as acting president, a member of the Cabinet
would assume the role. 15 But the statute provides that the legislative
officers could still decide later to take over as acting president. The
upshot of this scenario is that there could be multiple successors
within a matter of weeks or months, which could prove destabilizing
to the nation.16
Even if a lawmaker never utilized the Act’s “bumping” (or
“supplantation”) provision to oust the acting president, the potential
for its use could place the Speaker and president pro tempore in the
position of compromising the independence of the executive branch
by placing the threat of removal over the occupant of the Oval
Office.17 This hobbling of the presidency is a recipe for unstable
and ineffective governance. 18
12

See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons
in Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 1021 (2010).
13
See Americo R. Cinquegrana, Presidential Succession Under 3 U.S.C. § 19 and
the Separation of Powers: If at First You Don’t Succeed, Try, Try Again, 20
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 105, 116-17 (1992); THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R46450, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12 (2020).
14
See RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 137-42, 150, 175 (1951).
15
See 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2006).
16
See Cinquegrana, supra note 13, at 114-19; NEALE, supra note 13, at 12;
CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, BROOKINGS INST. & AM. ENTER. INST.,
PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE CONTINUITY OF THE PRESIDENCY 33-34
(2009) [hereinafter COGC].
17
See Cinquegrana, supra note 13, at 115-17.
18
See id. at 114-19.
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Finally, the 1947 Act suffers from a troubling and often
overlooked omission. While it provides that the Speaker would
become acting president if the president and vice president are both
incapacitated, the statute provides no procedure to determine
whether a dual incapacity exists.19
Recently declassified documents reveal that during the
presidencies of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill
Clinton, the White House counsel’s office suggested that the
Speaker would need to work with the Cabinet to make this decision
in a process akin to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s Section 4
mechanism.20 It is unclear if this approach from the Reagan-BushClinton presidencies remains in effect or if it has been replaced, as
documents from subsequent administrations have not yet been
publicly released. Either way, there is no statutory basis for
determining whether the two nationally elected officials are unable
to perform their official responsibilities or how they might
subsequently regain their powers and duties.
In an era when conspiracy theories run amok and
controversy is the coin of the realm, the idea that the Speaker and
Cabinet would carry out an undisclosed, ad hoc process to strip the
president and vice president of their authority—even temporarily—
is not a recipe for an acting president to enter the White House with
much legitimacy. And this suggestion, of course, presupposes that
the Speaker and Cabinet would be able to work together to make
such a determination in the first place. If the Speaker were not from
the president’s party, this task could be infinitely more difficult. 21
II. LEGISLATIVE ROADBLOCKS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
In light of these deficiencies in the 1947 statute, Congress
should revise the law by making Cabinet secretaries the immediate
successors to the presidency after the vice president, as the law
required from 1886 until 1947.22 While no legal regime can account
19

See Brownell, supra note 4, at 1030-31. Cf. John Feerick, Presidential
Inability: Filling in the Gaps, 33 POL. & LIFE SCI. 11, 18-21 (2014). Relatedly,
there is no statutory procedure for declaring a dual incapacity of the presidentelect and vice president-elect during the preinaugural period. See John Rogan,
Reforms for Presidential Candidate Death and Inability: From the Conventions
to Inauguration Day, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 583, 601-04 (2021); Marcello
Figueroa, Revisiting § 3 of the Twentieth Amendment 21-22 (Dec. 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
20
See Office of White House Counsel, Contingency Plans: Death or Disability of
the President (Mar. 16, 1993), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1009&context=twentyfifth_amendment_executive_materials [https://
perma.cc/9AA4-QN4B].
21
Cf. Feerick, supra note 19, at 19.
22
See Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
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for all possible contingencies, the return of Cabinet succession, with
some additional modifications in law, would vastly improve the
state of presidential succession.
One additional reform would be the inclusion of
ambassadors at the end of the line of succession to help make sure
that a mass catastrophe in Washington, D.C., would not eliminate
all potential acting presidents.23 Because most non-political
ambassadors remain at their overseas posts before and after
presidential inaugurations, 24 their inclusion in the line would have
an added benefit. If a large-scale calamity occurred during the
January 20 swearing-in ceremony and killed all would-be acting
presidents in the Capitol,25 there would be a successor to the Oval
Office already in place.
Another complementary step would involve the period
before Inauguration Day. Reforms for this period should aim to
ensure that the party that wins the presidency in the national election
actually controls the White House on January 20. Under current
law, if both the president-elect and vice president-elect die or neither
can qualify, the Speaker—who might be a member of the party
whose presidential candidate was recently defeated—would take the
oath as acting president on Inauguration Day.26 To avoid the
nullification of the recent national election, an alternate line of
succession could be created with respect to the period from midDecember until January 20.27
The Twentieth Amendment provides that Congress can
identify a “person” who can replace the president-elect if both
23

See COGC, supra note 16, at 45.
See, e.g., Todd Prince, U.S. Ambassadors: Who Might Stay and Who Might Go
Under Biden, RADIOFREEEUROPE (Nov. 9 2020), https://www.rferl.org/a/u-sambassadors-who-might-stay-go-under-biden/30938395.html [https://perma.cc
/N6WE-HPRF].
25
See Rogan, supra note 19, at 606-08.
26
See Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report,
Ensuring the Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 17 (2012) [hereinafter Ensuring]; Goldstein, supra note 12, at 1035.
27
See Rogan, supra note 19, at 602-03; Gregory Ascher et al., Planning for
Emerging Threats: Rethinking the Presidential Line of Succession, Fordham Law
School Rule of Law Clinic, 15-17, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1002&context=rule_of_law_clinic [https://perma.cc/5XMN-S3YE].
Cf. Feerick, supra note 19, at 19. The Twentieth Amendment applies once the
“President elect” is chosen. Though the Amendment is silent on the exact date, it
appears from legislative history that it means the day when state electors vote “on
the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December” as opposed to January
6, when Congress counts the electoral votes. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 7, 15. See also H.R.
REP. NO. 72-345, at 6 (1932) (supporting the earlier date); Rogan, supra note 19,
at 601 (same). But cf. Ensuring, supra note 26, at 17 (implying that January 6 is
the appropriate date); Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death:
Closing the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 217-18 (1995)
(same).
24
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nationally elected candidates die28 or neither can qualify for office
prior to the swearing-in.29 This language is more expansive than
Article II’s “Officer” requirement and would mean that the
succession statute could be amended to include lawmakers. A
possible approach is to name the House and Senate leaders whose
party had just won the presidency as the top two successors (i.e., the
Speaker, House minority leader, Senate majority leader or Senate
minority leader as the case may be).30 Using this alternate line of
succession for the death or failure to qualify of the two victorious
national candidates would help ensure that the will of the voters is
not nullified.31
Congress should also consider the merits of codifying the
approach suggested in the Reagan-Bush-Clinton White House
contingency plans—and recommended by Fordham Law’s Second
Presidential Succession Clinic—to formally authorize the individual
next in the line of succession to work with the Cabinet to determine
if the president and vice president are incapacitated. 32 This
See H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 2 (“Congress is given power to provide for the
case where neither a President nor a Vice President has qualified before the time
fixed for the beginning of the term, whether the failure of both to qualify is
occasioned by the death of both . . . or by any other cause . . . .”) (emphasis added).
See also GEORGE W. NORRIS, FIGHTING LIBERAL 342 (1992 ed.); Rogan, supra
note 19, at 601; Goldstein, supra note 12, at 1023. See also BRIAN KALT,
CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS 90 n.* (2012).
29
U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
30
See Rogan, supra note 19, at 602-03; Ascher et al., supra note 27, at 15-17. Cf.
Feerick, supra note 19, at 19. Removing the Speaker from the traditional line of
succession only to place the Speaker, House minority leader, Senate majority
leader or Senate minority leader (as the case may be) in a new alternate line of
succession seems at first blush to be contradictory. It is not. Article II requires
that presidential successors be “Officers” which may call into question whether
the Speaker is eligible. See supra note 11. The Twentieth Amendment, however,
limits those eligible only to “persons,” which obviously permits lawmakers to
serve. Moreover, the current line of succession includes the Speaker, whether or
not the lawmaker is of the same party as the president-elect. The alternate line of
succession proposed herein, which would govern preinaugural scenarios, would
be expressly linked to the party that won the White House, thus removing concern
about negating the recent national election results.
31
See Rogan, supra note 19, at 602-03; Ascher et al., supra note 27, at 15-17. Cf.
Feerick, supra note 19, at 19.
32
See Second Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession,
Report, Fifty Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations for
Improving the Presidential Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 958-64
(2017) [hereinafter Fordham Second Report]. See also Feerick, supra note 19, at
19-21. Congress might also expand the provision to authorize the next ranking
successor to fill in for the vice president in the context of Sections 3 and 4 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment in cases where the vice president is de facto
incapacitated, or the office is vacant. See Fordham Second Report, supra, at 95868; Feerick, supra note 19, at 20-21. See also Roy E. Brownell II, Vice
Presidential Inability: Why It Matters and What To Do When It Occurs, 48
HOFSTRA L. REV. 291 (2019).
28
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codification should also include a means for the latter two
officeholders to regain their powers and duties consistent with the
process in Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.33 Eliminating
the “bumping” provision and narrowing the resignation requirement
to include only lawmakers would also greatly strengthen the
presidential succession regime. 34
Of course, if removing lawmakers from the line of
succession were easy, it would have been done long ago. Doing so
presents a legislative Gordian Knot. Concern over which party
would stand to gain from changes to the presidential succession law
is an impediment that has bedeviled reform efforts dating back to
the very first such statute in 1792. 35 However, as some have
suggested,36 this concern might be alleviated by instituting a multiyear delay in implementation.
That way, Democrats and
Republicans could try to address matters without making political
calculations as to which party would benefit in the immediate term.
Another potential legislative roadblock is that introducing
such a measure might antagonize the Speaker and president pro
tempore. It is important to emphasize that criticism of lawmaker
succession should not be confused with criticism of Speakers or
presidents pro tempore themselves. Indeed, several of our nation’s
most talented and accomplished public figures have held these
positions.
Few measures become law without the approval of the
Speaker. By the same token, the president pro tempore can
complicate passage of such a measure in the Senate. Perhaps the
best way to reform the 1947 Act would be for both the Speaker and
president pro tempore to simultaneously introduce legislation to
remove themselves from the line of succession (outside of a
preinaugural context for the Speaker when he or she is of the same
33

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
In a preinaugural context involving the death or failure to qualify of both the
president-elect and vice president-elect, this Article argues that the House and
Senate leaders of the party that won the recent national election should be in line
to become acting president. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. Given
the Constitution’s prohibition against lawmakers serving in the executive branch,
the statutory resignation requirement should remain in place for the House and
Senate leaders, but not for executive branch officials. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6,
cl. 2 (“no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member
of either House during his Continuance in Office.”). Because the preinaugural
situation involves the Twentieth Amendment and its “person” language—not
Article II’s narrower “Officer” requirement—there is no concern that the acting
president (former lawmaker) must remain in his or her underlying legislative
position to remain eligible to serve. As discussed in Part I, some argue that Article
II requires that an acting president continue to hold his or her underlying “Office”
to remain eligible to serve as acting president. See SILVA, supra note 14, at 13742, 150, 175.
35
See Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 § 9 (repealed 1886).
36
See Goldsmith & Miller-Gootnick, supra note 9.
34
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party as the incoming president).37 This act of selflessness and
statesmanship would offer a clear signal that other lawmakers
should support the measure.
Moreover, the two presiding officers could make it known
that taking lawmakers out of the line of succession would also add
greater stability to Congress. As noted by Senator Ted Moss during
debate over the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,38 the Speaker’s elevation
to the presidency during a crisis would leave the House in disarray
by plunging the chamber into a leadership contest at a moment when
institutional stability would be at a premium, and when the House
might need to respond to a national emergency.
The Speaker and president pro tempore jointly requesting
reform of the 1947 Act would serve as a worthy capstone to the
legislative careers of the two presiding officers, whomever they may
be at the time. Voluntarily walking away from potential political
power—particularly when it involves the presidency—is a rare
thing, but it comes with a rich reward in our nation. Those who do
so tend to be remembered well by history. 39
CONCLUSION
Although the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 has not
been used in its first seventy-five years, the nation’s good fortune
could change at any moment. Threats to national security and the
presidency are ever-present. Reform of the 1947 Act is needed now.

37

See Brian Kalt, Opinion, A Better Line to the Oval Office, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11,
2015, 4:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-kalt-presidentialsuccession-is-unconstitutional-20150112-story.html
[https://perma.cc/T3A5WZ8R].
38
See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Const. Amends. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 65 (1964), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1006&context=twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials
[https://perma.cc/E2ER-C85L].
39
See RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 444, 454-58, 757, 770-71, 812
(2010) (noting that a significant part of George Washington’s legacy involves his
having resigned his military commission at the end of the Revolutionary War and
his having chosen to serve only two terms as president); Matthew Gault, Al
Gore—Greatest American Hero?, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-al-gore-hero-commentary/commentary-al-gore-greatest-american
-hero-idUSKBN1322DY [https://perma.cc/8HZQ-E9TE] (touting Al Gore and
Samuel Tilden for conceding controversial presidential elections and not throwing
the nation into chaos).

